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Background: Many low- and middle-income countries with a social health insurance system face challenges on
their road towards universal health coverage (UHC), especially for people in the informal sector and vulnerable
population groups or the informally employed. One way to address this is to subsidize their contributions through
general government revenue transfers to the health insurance fund.
This paper provides an overview of such health financing arrangements in Asian low- and middle-income countries. The
purpose is to assess the institutional design features of government subsidized health insurance type arrangements for
vulnerable and informally employed population groups and to explore how these features contribute to UHC progress.
Methods: This regional study is based on a literature search to collect country information on the specific institutional
design features of such subsidization arrangements and data related to UHC progress indicators, i.e. population
coverage, financial protection and access to care. The institutional design analysis focuses on eligibility rules,
targeting and enrolment procedures; financing arrangements; the pooling architecture; and benefit entitlements.
Results: Such financing arrangements currently exist in 8 countries with a total of 14 subsidization schemes. The
most frequent groups covered are the poor, older persons and children. Membership in these arrangements is
mostly mandatory as is full subsidization. An integrated pool for both the subsidized and the contributors exists
in half of the countries, which is one of the most decisive features for equitable access and financial protection.
Nonetheless, in most schemes, utilization rates of the subsidized are higher compared to the uninsured, but still
lower compared to insured formal sector employees. Total population coverage rates, as well as a higher share of
the subsidized in the total insured population are related with broader eligibility criteria.
Conclusions: Overall, government subsidized health insurance type arrangements can be effective mechanism to
help countries progress towards UHC, yet there is potential to improve on institutional design features as well as
implementation.
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More and more countries engage in health financing re-
forms in order to progress towards universal health cover-
age (UHC) [1] along their country context and objectives.
This serves to increase access for all to needed health ser-
vices of good quality without facing financial hardship
when seeking care [2]. Improved coverage with health ser-
vices has been shown to lead to better health indicators
and contribute to stronger economic development; at the
same time, there are political benefits for political leaders
who support a UHC agenda, “for the simple reason that
the majority of people (and of the electorate) wants access
to affordable, good quality health services” [3].
While not the only path towards UHC, an increasing
number of low- and middle-income countries have
established health insurance systems [4, 5]. Yet, the
process of transition to UHC in many of these countries
has proven to be challenging, particularly as to the cover-
age of people in the informal sector and other vulnerable
population groups [2, 5–8]. Especially vulnerable and poor
population groups cannot afford to pay contributions on
their own, because they have no income, a very low in-
come or a very unsteady income. One way to address this
specific challenge, equally faced at some point by the (now
high-income) countries, is government subsidization of
contribution payments through the transfer of general
government revenues to the health insurance fund [9]. Al-
ternative terms and conceptualization include “premium
subsidization” or “exemption from contributions”.
This health financing mechanism has a number of insti-
tutional characteristics of health insurance schemes and/
or is built upon its logic of pooling health risks and contri-
bution payments against entitlement. Its aim is to provide
an explicit and defined benefit package coverage to those
outside formal sector employment, in particular poor and
vulnerable population groups. General government reve-
nues transfers are provided to explicitly or implicitly pay
full or partial contributions on their behalf. For the benefi-
ciaries, these financing arrangements are thus non-
contributory or partially contributory depending on the
level of subsidization. As such contribution subsidization
breaks or weakens the link between being able to contrib-
ute oneself and being entitled to a benefit package [10].
This financing mechanism is in place in more than 40
low- and middle-income countries, and more countries
are further exploring or piloting this mechanism [11].
The existing body of literature contains single country
studies on health system and health financing reforms
[12–15]. Various reviews, e.g. Acharya et al. [16],
Tangcharoensathien et al. [8], Bitran [17] assess the
impact of diverse health financing reforms on informal
sector workers and vulnerable population groups. To fill a
gap, this paper specifically looks at health insurance
subsidization via government budget transfers as a potentialapproach to expand UHC with a regional focus on Asia. It
explores the patterns, commonalities and differences of
such arrangements among countries. The specific focus is
on the institutional design of these financing arrangements,
i.e. the policy, legal or regulatory specifications that define
these arrangements’ structure and the way they operate.
The aim is to identify and explore those critical institutional
design features that are conductive for UHC progress.
The paper’s focus on Asia combines the South-East
Asia and Western-Pacific Regions of the World Health
Organization (WHO). Similar regional focus studies
using the same methodology have been undertaken for
Europe and Latin America [18–20] and are underway
for the African Region.
The next section outlines the methods and the analytical
framework. The third section assesses the institutional de-
sign aspects as well as progress toward UHC. This is
followed by a discussion of the possible effects of specific
institutional design features and challenges related to pro-
gress toward UHC, while the last section concludes with
policy lessons.
Methods
In a first step, all countries from the WHO South East
Asia and Western Pacific Regions belonging to the group
of low- and middle- income countries, but excluding small
island states, were considered if the Global Health
Expenditure Database reported social health insurance
(SHI) expenditure (termed social security expenditure for
health in the Global Health Expenditure Database). In a
second step, a comprehensive literature search was
undertaken to identify those countries with government
subsidization arrangements for vulnerable and otherwise
uninsured people. This search rendered the following
countries: China, India, Indonesia, Mongolia, Philippines,
Thailand and Vietnam. Finally, the remaining countries
were screened to see whether there is a country with a
government subsidization arrangement, but without SHI
expenditure. This last step added Cambodia to the list of
countries included in this study.
Search terms such as “health insurance” OR “poor“-
OR”low-income“OR “subsid*” were combined with the
respective country’s name. In another round, the name
of the respective scheme was added. This served to col-
lect and collate specific information on the institutional
design aspects as per our analytical framework presented
in the next sub-section. For the assessment as to UHC
progress, we searched and collated data on the indica-
tors described further below. For that matter, the search
strategy used different combinations of the following
terms: country name OR scheme name, AND “impact”
OR “out-of-pocket” OR “utilization” OR “financial pro-
tection” OR “catastroph**”. The following databases were
screened: PubMed, JSTOR, ISS Web of Knowledge as
World Health Organization International Journal for Equity in Health  (2016) 15:165 Page 3 of 29well as Google Scholar. Thus, the study is based on a
literature review and, for the assessment of UHC pro-
gress, on a review of secondary databases, using both
published and non-published (grey) literature.
The search generated several publications for each
country, allowing for triangulation and capturing changes
in institutional design as well as in UHC related indicators.
Most of the studies are country health financing analyses
to review reform experiences, but no studies with explicit
impact evaluation design were found here. The analytical
framework outlined further below guided the information
extraction process from the literature, as well as data com-
pilation and organisation.
To identify plausible contributions and patterns of insti-
tutional design features in relation to UHC progress, we
plotted the improvements in UHC related progress indica-
tors against the respective institutional design features for
the eight countries. Where data points of different years
are available, progress towards UHC over time and in rela-
tion to changes in institutional design can be assessed.
However, it was often difficult to do so due to scarce data
availability for most of the indicators. This is a limitation
to this study, and this analysis is of explorative nature.
Our analytical framework to assess government
subsidization arrangements is broadly guided by the
three health financing functions of revenue raising, pool-
ing and purchasing described in Kutzin [21]. As such, it
specifically illuminates the following related areas: eligi-
bility, targeting and enrolment rules; financing arrange-
ments; the pooling arrangements; and benefit package
design (as one key element of purchasing). The detailed
analytical framework is presented in Table 1, which spe-
cifies the institutional design aspects and outlines how
these potentially relate to progress toward UHC. Pro-
gress toward UHC is assessed along the following three
indicators: (1) population coverage, understood as affili-
ation to the health financing arrangement under study
here; (2) financial protection; and (3) access to health
care services [22].
The design features and progress indicators are de-
fined and explained in more detail in the next section. It
is important to note that subsidized enrolment and
coverage in such schemes is only one possible and plaus-
ible factor among several to explain improvements in
the level of financial protection and access to care of
subsidized beneficiaries. The overall economic and fiscal
situation is thereby decisive in expanding fiscal space




In the eight countries included in this study, there are a
total of 14 health insurance-type arrangements to whichgovernments provide budget tranfers to extend coverage
to people in the informal sector and poor and vulnerable
population groups. Most countries are lower-middle
income countries, with Cambodia being the only low in-
come country. China, India and Indonesia have several
separate subsidization arrangements for different popu-
lation groups. Table 2 provides an overview of these 14
schemes. All subsidization arrangements are financed
publicly and regulated by government. They are also op-
erated by a public agency with the exception of all five
Indian schemes that are run by private insurance com-
panies, but are also regulated by government. As such,
there is a purchaser-provider split in all countries. Since
2011, India’s Rajiv Aarogyasri is managed by a state
agency [24]. Rajiv Aarogyasri was significantly rede-
signed in 2014 when the Andhra Pradesh State was split
into the two states of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh
[25]. Since then the scheme is named Aarogyasri Health
Care Trust in Telangana [26] and Dr. NTR Vaidya
Seva in Andhra Pradesh [27]. This paper assesses
Rajiv Aagogyasri’s design features until 2014.
Mongolia and the Philippines were the first countries to
introduce such arrangements, in 1994 and 1996 respect-
ively. In the first half of the 2000s, Cambodia’s Health
Equity Funds (HEFs), Thailand, Vietnam, China’s New
Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme (NRCMS), India’s
Yeshasvini Health Insurance and the Indonesian scheme
followed. India’s remaining four schemes and China’s
Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance (URBMI) were
introduced in the second half of the 2000s. China’s
URBMI and NRCMS are complemented by the Medical
Financial Assistance Scheme, which pays the co-
contribution of the poorest and other specific popula-
tion groups. Likewise, Cambodia’s Government Subsidy
Scheme (SUBO), as a way to replicate and expand the
number of HEFs, was introduced in 2006. Notably, HEF
and SUBO are not yet in place nationwide. As their ra-
tionale focuses on paying user fees for health care visits
for affiliated poor people, rather than subsidizing con-
tributions for entitlement to a benefit package, they are
a border case in this group of subsidized health insur-
ance type schemes.
In Indonesia, there are also local government led
subsidization schemes, called Jaminan Kesehatan Daerah
(Jamkesda). Yet, these will not be assessed here given
lack of data and high variation among these. These local
government schemes were introduced in 2004 and
directly target the poor and near-poor not covered by
Jamkesmas [38]. Major health financing reforms geared
towards integrating the country’s various insurance
schemes were introduced in early 2014 and are in the
process of being implemented. In this paper, we largely
focus on Indonesia’s health financing setup prior to 2014
for which information and data is available.
Table 1 Overview of analytical framework
Institutional design aspect Related policy choices Intermediate output Indicators UHC progress indicators





Definition of vulnerability (e.g. low
income, poverty, informal sector,
children, pregnant women)
Share of eligible among the bottom
two income quintiles and other
vulnerable groups
Total population coverage
(i.e. enrolment in health
insurancefund), differentiated
along income quintiles
Targeting method E.g. universal (based on a very broad
criterion such as residence or no
employment in the formal sector), indirect
(based on socio-demographic,
socio-economic or geographic
characteristics usually correlated with
poverty and vulnerability), direct (through a
means assessment or proxy means testing);
different targeting approaches can be in
place at the same time for different groups
Share of the exempted/subsidized
within total (insured) population; share
of the exempted/subsidized among
those being targeted for exemption/
subsidization (targeting effectiveness
of the system), Income groups
exempted/subsidized
Enrolment process Active enrolment by the beneficiary or
automatic enrolment by the authorities










Full or partial (a co-contribution is required) Share of the exempted/subsidized
within total (insured) population; share
of the exempted/subsidized among those
being targeted for exemption/subsidization
(importance of budget transfers)
Type of transfer logic Individual-based (a specific amount is
being paid for each exempted individual)
or lump-sum (a lump sum transfer for the
entire population is made)
Calculation logic to
determine the amount of
funds to be transferred
E.g. based on regular contribution levels,
minimum or average wages, specific
percentage of the government budget,
negotiated by the government
Financing source of the
budget transfers
E.g. general government revenues from
central or sub-national levels, earmarked
government revenues, transfers from other
health insurance funds (cross-subsidization),
donor funding
Sufficient funding for a comprehensive
benefit package







Type of pool(s) (general) Single pool or multiple pools Degree of fragmentation,




Type of pool (exempted/
subsidized)
Exempted/subsidized integrated in
the pool with contributors, or separate
pool for the exempted/subsidized
Type of health insurance
affiliation membership of
the contributors
Voluntary or mandatory Financial protection
Purchasing arrangements and benefit package design
Range of services covered
by the benefit package
E.g. comprehensive, in-patient focus,
out-patient focus, pharmaceuticals, dental




Different or same package as that for
contributors
Efficiency
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Table 1 Overview of analytical framework (Continued)





Type of payment and rate
aCatastrophic health expenditure occurs when a household’s total out-of-pocket health payments equal or exceed 40 % of the household’s non-subsistence spending, as
per the WHO definition. Impoverishing health expenditure means that out of pocket expenditure shifts a household below the poverty line or even deeper into
poverty [23]
World Health Organization International Journal for Equity in Health  (2016) 15:165 Page 5 of 29Eligibility and enrolment
Eligible population groups
The eligibility rules are an expression of a country’s per-
ception of which population groups are considered
“vulnerable” to be entitled for subsidy, thus determining
the number of subsidized people. In general, “vulnerable
groups” can be defined as those groups that due to eco-
nomic, demographic, geographic or other characteristics
have an increased susceptibility to not having adequate
access to health services with financial protection [39].
However, the subsidized need to be distinguished from
the insured family dependents when they are covered via
their principal affiliate through the principle of cross-
subsidization by contributors. Family dependents usuallyTable 2 Country overview
Country
(World Bank country income
classification) [28]
Name of the scheme(s) (and its abbreviati
Cambodia
(Low)
Health Equity Funds (HEFs)
Government Subsidy Scheme (SUBO)
China
(Upper-middle)
New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme (N
Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance (U
Medical Financial Assistance (MFA), which
to NRCMS and URBMI by covering the co-
or the cost-sharing of the poorest
India
(Lower-middle)
Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (nation-w
Yeshasvini Health Insurance in Karnataka S
Rajiv Aarogyasri Community Health Insura
Pradesh State (Rajiv Aarogyasri) (until 2014
Kalaignar in Tamil Nadu State




Jaminan Kesehatan Masyarakat (Jamkesma
Mongolia
(Lower-middle)
National Health Insurance Fund
Philippines
(Lower-middle)
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (P
Thailand
(Upper-middle)
Universal Coverage Scheme (UCS)
Vietnam
(Lower-middle)
Vietnam Social Security (VSS)
The bibliographic references used for each country are indicated in parenthesis in thisinclude children up to a defined age, non-working spouses
(most often women), or in some cases elderly parents.
As Table 3 reveals, the most frequent population
groups being subsidized are those below the (national)
poverty line or the 20 % poorest (five countries), followed
by older persons and children (three countries) and those
outside formal employment (three schemes). Women
form a considerable part of these eligible population
groups. A special case is India’s Yeshasvini, where eligi-
bility is restricted to members of rural cooperatives and
their family. Vietnam is also unusual with 25 eligible
groups defined, including various socio-demographic and
socio-economic groups such as children, students, infor-
mal sector workers, ethnic minorities in geographicallyon) Year of introduction of subsidization arrangements
2000 [29]
2006 [30]
RCMS) Launched in 2003 (fully implemented in 2008) [31]
RBMI) Launched in 2007 (fully implemented in 2010) [31]
is complementary
contribution and/
2003 (rural regions); 2007 (urban regions) [31]
ide) (RSBY) 2008 (fully implemented in 2013) [32]






s) Introduced as Asuuransi Kesehatan Masyarakat Miskin
(Askeskin) in 2005; after extension renamed into




Introduced as Health Care fund for the poor in 2002,
extended and restructured in 2005 [37]
and the following tables
Table 3 Eligibility rules and targeting
Country Entitled groups Organisation responsible
for identification
Targeting method employed Type of
membership
Cambodia:




Direct: means test (prior—combination
of means test screening of a
population and consultation with
community representatives; or at
presentation of treatment—based on
asset ownership) [29]
Voluntary [29]




Direct: means test (pre- and
post-identification) and supporting
letter from authority [30]
Voluntary [41]
China:




school students (but not all
groups are eligible in all
cities), other unemployed
urban residents, must be
registered in urban area [31]
Local government [42] Indirect: social and demographic
criteria, direct targeting for additional
subsidy for the poor [42]
Voluntary [31]
NRCMS Rural population with an
agricultural resident
registration [31]





People living below the
poverty line, beneficiaries
of social assistance schemes,
partly also other groups
determined by rural and



























Direct: proxy means test, district
below poverty line list prepared by
state government and planning
commission estimates, using 2002
assessment (perhaps limited below
poverty line list, possible target group
much larger—more than 75 % of
population and more of 93 % of
informal workers) [32]
Voluntary [12]
Yeshasvini Rural co-operative society
members and families in
Karnatka (min. membership
of 6-months), below




societies (guided by a
enrolment rate target) [24]
Indirect: cooperative membership as
criterion [24]
Voluntary [24]
Rajiv Aarogyasri White ration card holders or
annual household income
below Rs. 75,000 in urban
areas and below Rs. 60,000
in rural areas, entire family,
below poverty line and
above poverty line [24]
Trust transfers data to
insurance company [48]
Direct: means test (existing assessment
for white ration card) [12]
Voluntary [12]
Kalaignar Below poverty line or
annual household income
below Rs. 72,000 and
families of 26 welfare
boards [24]
State government [24] Direct: means test [24] Voluntary [12]
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Table 3 Eligibility rules and targeting (Continued)
Vajapayee Arogyasri Below poverty line families
(up to 5 members) [24]
State government [24] Direct: means test, registration data
from Food, Civil Supplies and
Consumer Affairs Department [12]
Voluntary [12]
Indonesia The poor (2005): national








on welfare and poverty
indicators from BPS or
family planning board [33]
Direct: proxy means testing
(per-capita consumption) plus local
government eligibility criteria (there is
a quota set for each district based on
poverty rates from the national
socioeconomic survey) [33]
Voluntary [33]
Mongolia Citizens covered by social
assistance, persons on
military service, pensioners,
children < 16 years or




Until 2000 also part-time
students and herders [49]
Central government [49] Direct: method unclear (those eligible
for social assistance)
Indirect: social and demographic
criteria [50]
Mandatory [49]
Philippines The poor (as poorest 25 %







Direct: proxy means test (= family
income test) [35]
Mandatory [52]
Thailand Individuals not covered by
CSMBS or SSS schemes,
registration in primary care
network as single
requirement [36]
No specific targeting due
to universal eligibility [36]
Mandatory [36]
Vietnam Persons of merit and
dependants, veterans,
children <6 years (100 %
subsidy) [15]
n/a Indirect: social and demographic
criteria [53]
Mandatory [15]
The poor, ethnic minorities
(100 % subsidy) [15]
Local community and
district government [15]
Direct: means-test (yearly household
economic survey) plus community
involvement [15]
Mandatory [15]
Near-poor (below 130 %







(30 % subsidy) [15]
n/a n/a Mandatory [15]
School children, students
(30 % subsidy) [15]
n/a Indirect: social and demographic
criteria [53]
Mandatory [15]
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so-called persons of merit and their dependants, state
serving individuals and other non-Ministry state serving
individuals (e.g. members of the National Assembly and
People’s councils) [15].
Targeting approaches
Most countries employ some form of indirect or direct
targeting, and often both, to identify and select individuals
eligible for subsidization, but with considerable variationfound (see Table 3). Direct targeting is based on (proxy)
means testing by determining household income and/or
assets) [55]. Indirect targeting is applied to include persons
on the basis of socio-demographic (e.g., age, gender),
socio-economic (occupation, or employment status) or
socio-geographic characteristics. These characteristics are
easily observable and identifiable as well as correlated with
vulnerability [56].
A few countries employ only indirect targeting,
such as India’s Yeshasvini, and China’s NRCMS (with
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economic targeting criteria), whereas their comple-
mentary Medical Financial Assistance (MFA) program
applies a direct targeting approach. In Mongolia, the
main targeting approach is indirect using socio-
demographic criteria, but some specific groups are
targeted directly. Likewise, the Vietnam Social Security
(VSS) scheme applies both indirect and direct targeting
for about equal numbers of subsidized people. On the
other hand, the Philippines, Indonesia, Cambodia and all
Indian schemes (except Yeshasvini) use a direct targeting
approach only.
All countries that apply direct targeting use means
or proxy-means testing to identify the poor. Several
subsidization schemes draw on pre-existing databases
built up to grant other forms of social assistance, such as
the ration cards system in India [12] or the Equity Access
Card, also known as the Poor Card in Cambodia [57].
However, the thresholds that separate eligible and ineli-
gible individuals vary significantly across countries: India’s
Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) only includes
individuals below the country’s poverty line, whereas
Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines also attempt to
target the near-poor. In these three countries as well as
in the complementary MFA in China, the local commu-
nities play an important role in the identification
process [15, 44, 58, 59].
In a universalist approach, all individuals fulfilling a very
broad criterion (e.g. permanent residency in the country,
lack of coverage in another SHI scheme) are eligible.
Thailand is indeed the only country in this group with no
targeting and hence a universalist approach: all permanent
legal residents who are not covered by the formal sector
health insurance schemes are entitled to the state budget
financed Universal Coverage Scheme (UCS). In China,
URBMI’s eligibility criteria try to capture all urban legal
residents that are not part of the formal sector schemes,
thus also coming close to a universalist approach.
Type of affiliation
Membership in the subsidization programme can be
mandatory or voluntary, thus affecting pool size (and
the enrolment rate) and its risk composition. Notably,
affiliation for contributing members is mandatory in all
countries [24, 30, 31, 49, 60–62], except for the individu-
ally paying programme in Philippines [63] and non-
formal sector workers in Vietnam [15], whereas this
varies among the subsidized. The Thai UCS provides
mandatory coverage. Likewise, in Vietnam, Philippines
and Mongolia, membership in the subsidized arrange-
ments is de jure mandatory for eligible individuals
without other insurance coverage. However, as a conse-
quence of weak enforcement, it is de facto not
mandatory. This is particularly the case for the near-poor in Vietnam who are only partially subsidized. In
contrast, as per the legal provisions, membership is vol-
untary in Cambodia, Indonesia, India and China. Yet for
administrative reasons and to avoid adverse selection, all
household members need to be enrolled in India and
China [12, 14]. In China, moreover, local authorities
strongly encourage people to enrol which is a result of
the incentives given to local authorities to affiliate as
many members as possible. As such, it might be per-
ceived as mandatory [64].
Enrolment process and organization in charge of
enrolment
With respect to the enrolment proceedings, two patterns
are found, with more details provided in Table 4: 1) ac-
tive enrolment by the beneficiary him/herself is required;
or 2) authorities, in most cases at the local government
level, automatically enrol an individual or a household,
once identified or recognized to be eligible, without re-
quiring further action by the beneficiaries. The first pat-
tern is usually found in schemes with indirect targeting,
namely in Mongolia, Vietnam (for the partially subsidized),
China’s URBMI and NRCMS, and India’s Yeshasvini. In
the lattercase, the local cooperative secretary would con-
tact and encourage eligible individuals to enrol [65], simi-
lar to what is found in China.
In contrast, the second pattern is found in schemes
where direct targeting is employed. In Vietnam (for the
fully subsidized), the Philippines and Indonesia, the local
government administration actively enrols identified
beneficiaries, whereas non-governmental organisations,
national hospitals and health districts do so in
Cambodia. In the Thai UCS, enrolment is automatic
once individuals have registered at a health facility,
which they can also do when seeking care [36]. Similarly
in Cambodia’s HEFs and SUBO, individuals can be en-
rolled at the time of seeking care, if they meet the eligi-
bility criteria (post identification).
In India’s RSBY and all Indian state-level schemes, in-
stead, private insurance companies—with the support
of local authorities and non-governmental organiza-
tions—are responsible for enrolling and providing in-
surance coverage to eligible beneficiaries [12]. However,
this practice has caused a number of problems in RSBY:
although private insurance companies registered benefi-
ciaries, they did not immediately deliver the insurance
cards that are indispensable to receive benefits. Insur-
ance companies claimed that this delay was due to
technical difficulties, yet some authors have suggested
that insurance companies benefited by receiving the
subsidies for the enrolled whilst not having to provide
benefits immediately [47, 70]. However, anecdotal evi-
dence hints to similar challenges in some other coun-
tries with public schemes.
Table 4 Enrolment procedures
Country and scheme Type of enrolment Organization(s) responsible for identification
Cambodia:
HEFs Automatic enrolment by authorities Ministry of Planning, village network
Trained poverty assessor at health facility
(for post-identification)
SUBO Automatic enrolment by authorities [57] Local government, commune councils, village
network (for pre-identification)
Trained poverty assessor at health facility
(for post-identification) [57]
China:
URBMI Active enrolment by beneficiary [42] Local governments [42]
NRCMS Active enrolment by beneficiary [66] Local governments [66]
MFA Partly automatic enrolment by township government/county
leading group of those eligible for social assistance or
nominated by village committee (especially for contribution
subsidization)
Partly active application by beneficiary (especially for additional
reimbursement) [44–46]
County civil affairs office, village officer, village
committee [44–46]
India:
RSBY Automatic enrolment by authorities [24] State government, insurance company, Smart Card
Operator, local government [12]
Yeshasvini Active enrolment by beneficiary [48] Cooperative Societies [65]
Rajiv Aarogyasri Automatic enrolment by authorities [67] Insurance company [12]
Kalaignar Automatic enrolment by authorities [24] Insurance company [12]
Vajapajee Arogyasri Automatic enrolment by authorities [24] Insurance company [12]
Indonesia Automatic enrolment by authorities [59] Local governments [59]
Mongolia Active enrolment by beneficiary [49] Insurance branch [49]
Philippines Automatic enrolment by authorities [68] Local governments [68]
Thailand Automatic enrolment by authorities [36] Local primary care network [69]
Vietnam Active enrolment by beneficiary [15] Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs: those
receiving unemployment benefits, social protection
or social security allowance
Commune people committee: poor, children
under 6 etc. [15]
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Level of subsidization
Another decisive aspect is the actual level of subsidization
and the remaining share of co-contribution. In 10 out of
the 14 subsidization schemes, the eligible beneficiaries are
fully subsidized from government revenues and do not co-
contribute (see Table 5). There is an annual registration
fee of 30 Rs. in India’s RSBY, which comes to 4–7 % of the
amount that the government provides as a subsidy, vary-
ing across states [24].
In the remaining four schemes (China’s NRCMS and
URBMI, Vietnam, India’s Yeshavini), some or all groups,
as listed in Table 5, receive a partial subsidy only and
have to partially contribute. In China, the subsidy level
is above 80 % in most regions (up to 85 %), but as low
as 23 % elsewhere. The complementary MFA pays the
remaining co-contribution for a small proportion of bene-
ficiaries (for 6 % of NRCMS and 7 % of URBMI enroleesin 2011) [31]. In Vietnam, the subsidy level ranges from
30 to 70 % of the set contribution depending on the
groups, but the poorest individuals as well as other popu-
lation groups receive a full subsidy. The subsidy level is
about 40 % in India’s Yeshavini, whereby the subsidy level
varies from year to year depending on available resources
and willingness-to-pay findings [75].
Type of transfer mechanism and calculation approach
As to the type of transfer mechanism, all countries fol-
low the same logic with the transfer being an implicit or
explicit per-capita amount per beneficiary, as per their
regulatory or legal provisions. The alternative would be
to provide a lump sum that is unrelated to the precise
number of number of eligible beneficiaries. There are
three approaches found to set this per capita subsidy
amount which determines the average amount available
for health care expenditure of each subsidized member
Table 5 Financing arrangements
Country Level of subsidization Transfer mechanism of subsidy Calculation logic of subsidy Financing source of
subsidy
Revenue to expenditure ratio
(for all subsidized members
unless specified, data year)
Cambodia:
HEFs Full [41] Individual-based [29] n/a Donor and government
funds [29]
n/a
SUBO Full Individual-based [57] n/a Central government
revenues [57]
n/a
China: Estimations of future health care
expenditure per subsidized
member [66]
Total annual government subsidy
for each subsidized member
should not be less than a certain
amount, e.g. 120 CNY per year
per NRCMS subsidized member
(2010) [71]
URBMI Partial: from 41 % to 85 % in
central and western provinces;
from 23 to 75 % in eastern
provinces (2010) a [72]
Individual-based [72] Provinces/counties
revenues [31]
139 % (average, 2011) [73]
NRCMS Partial: 80 % (2012) [31] Individual-based [72] Provinces/counties
revenues [31]
123 % (average, 2011) [73]
MFA Covers remaining co-contribution
to result in full subsidization [31]




RSBY Full, yet small registration fee [24] Based on the number of families [24] Insurance companies bidding
process [74]
Central government
and state revenues [12]
263 % (2009-10)[24]
Yeshasvini Partial: 40 % (2009) [12] Individual-based [24] Estimations of future health care
expenditure per subsidized
member [75]
State revenues [24] 133 % (2009-10) [24]
Rajiv Aarogyasri Full [12] Based on the number of families [24] Insurance companies bidding
process [24]
State revenues [24] 83 % (2009-10)[24]
Kalaignar Full [12] Based on the number of families [24] Insurance companies bidding
process [24]
State revenues [24] 102 % (2009) [24]
Vajpayee Arogyasri Full [12] Based on the number of families [24] Insurance companies bidding
process [24]
State revenues [24] n/a
Indonesia Full [61] Individual-based [33] Set by government based on
expenditures of previous years
(6500 Rp. monthly in 2010) [33]
Central government
revenues [33]
112 % (2010) [33]
Mongolia Full [49] Individual-based Contribution amount of self-
employed is taken as reference
(set by government (670 MNT per





















Table 5 Financing arrangements (Continued)




30 % (2010) [76]
Thailand Full [108] Individual-based Estimations of future health care
expenditure per UCS member [77]
Central government
revenues [77]
100 % (2010) [77]
Vietnam Full
Partial: from 30 % to 70 % [15, 54]
Individual-based [15] Based on contributions levels of
contributing members (4.5 % of
minimum salary) [15]
Central government revenues
and social security funds [15]
210 % (poor, 2010)
101 % (near-poor, 2010)
199 % (average, 2010) [15]
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on estimations of future health care expenditure per
subsidized member. This method is applied in China as
well as in Thailand, although in a more implicit way. In
the two Chinese schemes, the level of central govern-
ment allocations also depends on the regions’ level of
economic development as well as affordability consider-
ations [78]. Estimated health care expenditure was also
the starting point in Indonesia, and allocations are now
adjusted based on expenditure of the previous year. A
second logic is to base the subsidy amount upon the
contribution rate of contributing members that is ap-
plied to a reference salary, such as in the Philippines and
Vietnam, or on a set contribution amount (that of non-
salaried people), like in Mongolia. Third, in all Indian
schemes other than Yeshasvini the actual amount of
government revenue transfers is determined through a
tender process where insurance companies bid for a
“premium” at which they would provide insurance
coverage for a family in a pre-defined population group
and benefit package [12].
These approaches serve to make government revenue
transfers more predictable and needs-adapted by pro-
spectively fixing the per capita subsidy amount, rather
than depending on the country’s economic situation or
budget allocations and negotiations. However, this has
only been partially successful. Independent of the type of
approach to set the transfer amount, the actually trans-
ferred funds were found to differ from the amount
established as per the calculation formula or negotia-
tions. This was the case for example in the Philippines
[76, 79, 80], Mongolia [13] and Indonesia [81, 82]. Simi-
larly, in Thailand fiscal constraints resulted in an ap-
proved per capita amount that has been lower than the
proposed per capita expenditure estimations between
2002 and 2010 [36, 77]. Overall, for the actual subsidy
allocation, the regulatory provisions and the related calcu-
lation principles appear to have been of limited relevance
in some countries, and may be explained by budget con-
straints, missing data on the number of the eligible or sub-
sidized members, or other political priorities.
Financing source of government revenue transfers
In all subsidization arrangements assessed here, the fi-
nancing source for subsidies are primarily general gov-
ernment revenues. These come from central government
revenues in Vietnam, Mongolia, Thailand, Indonesia and
the Philippines (since 2011). Sub-national (i.e. state)
government revenues are the source used for India’s state-
based subsidization schemes. Finally, the remaining
schemes—China and India’s RSBY—are financed by
both central and sub-national government revenues,
whereby the main share comes from provinces/counties
and states respectively. A unique feature is found inCambodia, where subsidies to HEFs are also financed from
donor funds. Moreover, in Vietnam, another key source
are social security revenues for social security beneficiar-
ies, such as the registered unemployed, pensioners and
beneficiaries of social assistance allowances [15]. Notably,
the Philippines is the only country which makes use of sin
taxes on tobacco and alcohol to subsidize the poorest and
most vulnerable groups [35, 83]. After the introduction of
this tax in 2012, the government revenues allocated for
subsidizing the poor increased significantly [84].
Pooling arrangements
Pooling architecture
Both single fund systems as well as multiple pool sys-
tems are present across Asia, with Table 6 providing
country details. In three out of the eight countries stud-
ied (Vietnam, the Philippines, Mongolia) the subsidized
population groups are part of the same pool as the con-
tributors in a single fund system. In contrast thereto,
China, Cambodia, Thailand, Indonesia and India have
separate, but non-competing schemes for the subsi-
dized population groups, resulting in fragmentation. In
these five countries, a formal sector health insurance
scheme or non-competing multiple schemes existed already
prior to the introduction of the subsidization arrangement.
Importantly, however, as of January 2014, the health insur-
ance schemes of Indonesia are being integrated into a single
national health insurance agency [85].
China’s separate subsidization schemes are further
fragmented into sub-national pools. Risk pooling by the
NRCMS schemes occurs at county level, with an average
pool size of 500,000 individuals, whereas risk pooling by
URBMI schemes is at municipal level with an average
pool size of 2 million members [14, 89]. There are no
risk equalization mechanisms in place across these sub-
pools, resulting in unequal per capita average expenditures
across counties and municipalities respectively [31].
Among the integrated systems, fragmentation along
sub-national lines is equally a concern in Vietnam and
the Philippines. Differences in revenue generation cap-
acity that determines resource allocation to provincial
sub-pools (in Vietnam) and local governments (in the
Philippines), and, in the absence of risk adjusted alloca-
tions or risk equalization, result in unequal average per
capita expenditure across the country. However, this is
the case for all insurance members, not only the subsi-
dized ones.
Revenue-expenditure ratio
Revenue sources of the subsidization arrangements in-
clude government revenue transfers, co-contributions by
beneficiaries where applicable, and in integrated schemes
these comprise also contributions from contributors.
The last column of Table 5 presents data on the total
Table 6 Pooling arrangements
Country and subsidization
arrangement




HEFs Separate [86] n/a
SUBO Separate [57] n/a
China: Multiple [31]
URBMI Separate [78] Pooling at municipal level, average pool size 2 m [14]
Approximately 330 risk pools in 2011 [31]
NCRMS Separate [78] Pooling at county level, average pool size 500 000 [87]
Approximately 2600 risk pools in 2011 [31]
MFA Additional to NRCMS and URBMI membership
Pooling at county level [31]
India: Multiple [24]
RSBY Separate [24] n/a
Yeshasvini Separate [24] n/a
Rajiv Aarogyasri Separate [67] n/a
Kalaignar Separate [24] n/a
Vajapayee Arogyasri Separate [24] n/a
Indonesia Multiple (single as
of 2014) [33]
Separate (integrated as of
2014) [85]
n/a
Mongolia Single [49] Integrated [88] n/a
Philippines Single [63] Integrated [35] n/a
Thailand Multiple [36] Separate [36] n/a
Vietnam Single [37] Integrated [37] Resource allocation and reimbursement regulations
result in fragmentationa [37]
aCapitation level is linked to historical expenditure, expenditure ceiling is linked to contribution
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the revenue-expenditure ratio, based on aggregate data
for all subsidized members. This provides insights into
the sustainability of the scheme as well as the level of
cross-subsidization between contributors and the subsi-
dized in integrated schemes.
While data, especially recent one, is scarce, this ratio
strongly varies across countries and even within coun-
tries over time. Some schemes have a balance or a ratio
above 100 % and others have a ratio below 100 %. In the
Thai UCS, total revenues are more or less equal to
expenditure (ratio of 95–105 %), as well as in the
Philippines and Indonesia prior to 2009. Interestingly,
more frequent is the situation where revenues are higher
than expenditure (with a ratio above 105 %), such as
China’s NRCMS and URBMI, India’s Yeshasvini and
Kalaignar (in 2009), Indonesia (in 2010). This ratio even
amounts to around 200 % in Vietnam and above in In-
dia’s RSBY. Moreover, in Indonesia, there was a high ra-
tio of 140 % in 2009 when the local government-based
Jamkesda scheme came into place, which resulted in
double coverage of many people. Another reason for
Jamkesmas’ relatively lower expenditure was that not allof the enrolees had a health card and hence had no ac-
cess to benefits. In 2010 this ratio decreased to 112 %,
not because of increased utilization rates, but because
the per capita transfer amount was reduced. Finally,
some subsidization schemes experience a "deficit": the
ratio is below 95 % in the Philippines (2010), India’s
Rajiv Aarogyasri (2009-10) as well as Mongolia, which
reached only 30 % in 2009.
Ratios above or below 100 % indicate that the revenues
(subsidy amounts) and expenditure may need to be bet-
ter linked, particularly in separate schemes. This is be-
cause a persisting deficit endangers the sustainability of
the system and results in coverage erosion, under-
provision and rationing of benefits by providers. A large
surplus could also create efficiency losses since resources
could have been used for other purposes.
Level and direction of cross-subsidization in integrated
pools
Integrated schemes for both the subsidized and the con-
tributors are financed by contributions from contribu-
tors as well as by general government revenue transfers,
with the possibility of cross-subsidization between
World Health Organization International Journal for Equity in Health  (2016) 15:165 Page 14 of 29different insured groups depending on the level of rev-
enue coming from each source and per capita average
expenditure for different groups. Comparing revenue-
expenditure ratios for the subsidized with that of the
contributors reveals the degree and direction of cross-
subsidization (cf. Table 5). In fact, in Mongolia and the
Philippines (for 2009 and 2010), this ratio of subsidized
members is lower than that of non-subsidized groups,
suggesting that the latter cross-subsidized the former. In
contrast, the revenue-expenditure ratio of subsidized
members in Vietnam was higher than that of contributors,
such that cross-subsidization occurred from subsidized
members to contributors (in 2009 and 2010). Specifically,
formal sector employees, but also the subsidized groups of
the poor, children and students (who are only partially
subsidized) cross-subsidized pensioners, the voluntarily
insured as well as the partially subsidized group of the
near-poor (for 2009 only). Moreover, the revenue-
expenditure ratio of the poor and children is considerably
above 100 % due to low expenditure levels of these groups.
As a result, the government budget transfers also indir-
ectly subsidize other groups [15].
Benefit package design
Scope of health services covered
Purchasing consists of the allocation of pooled funds to
the health care service providers on behalf of the popu-
lation for a defined benefit package. The definition of
the range of services covered in the benefit package is
decisive for financial protection and access to care, as
are the cost-sharing mechanisms. The benefit packages
are being set by the government in all countries. More-
over, all schemes assessed here provide in-kind-benefits
(i.e. health services are directly covered and paid for by
the scheme as a third party payer, with no bill settlement
of beneficiaries other than paying co-payments). The
exceptions are China and the Philippines, where the
insured have to advance payments and are later
reimbursed by the insurance. Regarding the scope of the
defined benefit package (see Table 7), two patterns
emerge: The first is a relatively comprehensive package,
and the second pattern is a more restricted package pri-
marily covering inpatient care only. The more compre-
hensive package includes outpatient and inpatient care
at all levels and is available in five countries (Vietnam,
Mongolia, Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand). These
schemes also reimburse pharmaceuticals that are in-
cluded in the country’s respective essential medicines
list. Vietnam’s package is broadest on paper, as all avail-
able services are covered in principle, but restrictions
come in through a ceiling on the total amount per per-
son per year. The second pattern of a more restricted
package is found in all Indian arrangements. China’s
NRCMS and URBMI are somewhat in-between the twopatterns, with more than half of NRCMS and URBMI
counties having some outpatient care in the package [72].
Comparison of the benefit entitlements between the
subsidized and contributors reveal crucial differences
across these two groups in some countries. In fact, bene-
fits are largely the same or similar in two countries:
Vietnam and Mongolia. In contrast, the benefit package
for the subsidized is more generous in the Philippines
(with a larger outpatient benefit package), Indonesia
(with more treatment options) and Thailand (compared
to the social security scheme) [36, 60, 95]. On the other
hand, they are smaller for those of the Thai UCS (when
compared to the civil servant scheme) and for the subsi-
dized in India and China, with a much more restrictive
coverage of outpatient services. However, outpatient
consultations have been introduced in the benefit pack-
age of India’s RSBY in 2014 [91].Cost-sharing mechanisms and rates
The cost-sharing mechanisms and rates vary consider-
ably among countries (see Additional file 1). Thailand
and Indonesia are the only countries without any formal
cost-sharing, and in Mongolia the subsidized members
are exempted from nearly all co-payments. In all other
schemes, cost-sharing, e.g. in the form of co-insurance
and co-payments and benefit ceilings such as in
Vietnam, Mongolia and China apply also to the subsi-
dized. The cost-sharing rates range from 5 % of total
health insurance expenses for the poor in Vietnam [15]
to 50 % in the Philippines [96] and amount to about 50–
60 % in both Chinese schemes [14]. But importantly
MFA beneficiaries in China receive cash assistance for
some part of outpatient and inpatient cost-sharing [31],
thus cushioning the financial burden.
In comparison to the contributors, the cost-sharing
rates for subsidized members are the same or similar in
Thailand and Indonesia. They are higher in China only,
but lower in Vietnam, Mongolia and the Philippines. For
India, comparative information is not available, however
there are no annual benefit ceilings applied in the con-
tributory Central Government Health Scheme (CGHS)
in contrast to the subsidized arrangements [12]. None-
theless, with or without formal cost-sharing mechanisms
in place, people also face informal payments in several
countries [24, 31, 37, 49] with potentially negative im-
pacts on access, equity as well as impoverishment.Progress on universal health coverage related indicators
For the assessment of UHC progress, we collected sec-
ondary data on the UHC related indicators. Clearly, the
available evidence is limited, and the assessment on
progress towards UHC can thus only provide a general
idea of the impact trends.
Table 7 Benefit package design
Country Scope of benefit package
Services covered Compared to regularly insured population
Cambodia:
HEFs District referral hospital medical services, transport
costs from health centre to referral hospital, food
for patients and carers, sometimes funeral costs [29]
n/a
SUBO Outpatient and inpatient services at health centre
level, inpatient only at national hospital, national
centres and referral hospital level [30], user fees [40]
n/a
China:
URBMI Inpatient care and critical outpatient care for
accidents or limited chronic/fatal diseases
(coronary heart disease, renal haemodialysis) [14]
No preventive care
More services covered in richer coastal cities [42]
Local governments determine financing level
and details of arrangements.
Less than UEBMI: no Medical Savings Account,
most outpatient services are not covered except
for very few selected diseases [14]
NRCMS Inpatient and outpatient services in about 70 % of
NRCMS counties, only inpatient services in the
other 30 %
Listed drugs (approx. 400) [78]
There are 4 models of how NRCMS operates
throughout China:
Model I (in place in 17 % of counties): Inpatient
services only
Model II (in place in 11 % of counties): Inpatient
services and outpatient services for catastrophic
diseases (separate deductibles and reimbursement caps)
Model III (in place in 7 % of counties): Inpatient
services according to a formula, outpatient services
and preventive care according to specific formula
through collective funds (usually no deductible and
reimbursement cap)
Model IV (in place in 65 % of counties): Inpatient
services according to a formula, outpatient services
and preventive care paid through household medical
savings account (with deductible and reimbursement
cap) [90]
Less than UEMBI [78]
India:
RSBY Mainly inpatient secondary care: inpatient services on
a “day care” basis (subject to sub-limits), transport
allowance; pre-existing conditions (minimal exclusions)
and maternity covered, care delivered in network
hospitals including private hospitals (free choice);
recently outpatient consultations [74]
Public transport costs up to Rs. 100 per visit and
Rs. 1000 per year, post hospitalisation drugs for
5 days [91]
Less: ceiling, no out-patient services, no medicines
as in CGHS, no preventive and wellness care and
no compensatory cash benefits for loss of wages
in case of illness or maternity (ESIS) [24]
Yeshasvini Inpatient secondary and tertiary care: all inpatient
charges associated with 823 specified surgical
procedures (except transportation) excluded are
certain high tech procedures
No follow-up investigation; no diagnostic-test for
non-surgery-related issues, no medicines
Included outpatient consulting at a network of
hospitals, since 2007 out-door treatment for
stabilization of specific medical emergencies,
normal deliveries and paediatric care during first
5-days of live, angioplasty procedure [92]
Less: ceiling, no medicines, no preventive and
wellness care (all compared to CGHS) and no
compensatory cash benefits for loss of wages in
case of illness or maternity (ESIS) [24]
Rajiv Aarogyasri 938 hospitalization procedures (surgical and medical),
largely tertiary care and some secondary care [24]
Less: ceiling, no out-patient services, no medicines
as in CGHS, no maternity, no preventive and
wellness care and no compensatory cash benefits
for loss of wages in case of illness or maternity
(ESIS) [24]
Kalaignar Inpatient tertiary care (626 surgical procedures) [12] n/a
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Table 7 Benefit package design (Continued)
Vajapayee Arogyasri Inpatient tertiary care including 402 predefined
packages and 50 follow-up packages [12]
n/a
Indonesia Free outpatient primary care in local health centres
and third class public hospital inpatient services
(registration required) including preventive measures
and maternity at public and private (only few)
providers [93]
No annual physical check-ups, dental prostheses,
fertility treatment, indirect costs (e.g. transportation) [60]
Less: Askes and Jamsostek include additional
annual physical check-up, under Jamsostek more
private providers but larger exclusions of
conditions [60]
As of 2012, Jamsostek also covers catastrophic
cases. [33]
Mongolia Outpatient services at secondary and tertiary care
levels; since 2010 outpatient diagnostic test up to
30 000 MNT per case per month; curative and
palliative inpatient care, rehabilitation and long-term
care; part of outpatient prescription drug expenses if
on National Essential Drug list [88]
n/a
Philippines Outpatient care, inpatient cute care, emergency care,
day surgeries, inpatient care in accredited hospitals [35]
More: outpatient care [35]
Thailand (Curative and preventive) outpatient and inpatient
health services, rehabilitation, certain high-tech
medical services (radio- and chemotherapy) but not
all, prescription drugs on a national list
Beneficiaries must follow the referral system (gatekeeper)
to obtain free care
Services usually at District Health System (district health
centres and hospitals), except for emergencies/accidents
[94]
Less than CSMBS
More than SSS [36]
Vietnam All ambulatory and hospital basic, advanced diagnostic
curative health services and therapeutic services
(including high-tech medical services), referral for higher
level services required, drugs inside reimbursement list,
transportation costs in case of referral
No occupational diseases, medical aid devices,
rehabilitation or home care [15]
Same [15]
Legend: UEBMI Urban Employee Basic Medical Insurance (China), Askes Asuransi Kesehatan (Indonesia), Jamsostek Jaminan Sosial Tenaga Kerja (Indonesia), CSMBS Civil
Servant Medical Benefit Scheme (Thailand), SSS Social Security Scheme (Thailand), CGHS Central Government Health Scheme (India), ESIS Employees’ State Insurance
Scheme (India)
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Here, population coverage is defined as the percentage
of the population that is enrolled to a health insurance
scheme. Total population enrolment rate vary substan-
tially across countries (see Table 8). They are very high
in Mongolia (100 % in 2014), China (99 % in 2012) and
Thailand (99 % in 2015). The lowest rates are found in
Cambodia (27 % in 2013) and India (25 % in 2014).
Another dimension is to capture the share of the actu-
ally subsidized insured members as compared to those
who are theoretically entitled or targeted as per entitle-
ment. This gives insights into the targeting effectiveness.
The Thai UCS with a universalist approach is the only
one with a 0 % exclusion error [77]. In schemes with in-
direct targeting, the coverage rates of the effectively sub-
sidized as a share of the theoretically eligible number of
people vary: it is high for China’s URBMI and NRCMS,
covering 93 and 95 % respectively as well as for school
children and students in Vietnam (80 %). In contrast,
India’s Yeshasvini reaches only 25 % of the intended
target group.Among subsidization schemes with direct targeting,
India’s Rajiv Aarogyasri, Vietnam for the poor and
China’s complementary MFA reach 100 % or close to
100 % of their target number. Coverage of target groups
is much lower in India’s RSBY, but also in Cambodia’s
HEFs, which is due to the fact that there is no nation-
wide coverage of HEFs nor SUBO. For the group of the
partially subsidized near-poor in Vietnam, the coverage
rate is only 25 % in 2011. On the other hand, having a
closer look on targeting effectiveness also reveals that
most schemes have suffered from severe inclusion errors
in the past (see Table 8).
Another population coverage indicator is the share of
the subsidized as of the total population to reveal the
magnitude of the subsidization arrangement. In most
countries, this share ranges between 15 and 50 %. This
ratio is higher in Thailand and China’s rural population,
74 and 62 % respectively, but extremely low in India’s
Vajapayee Arogyasri Scheme (0.12 %) and Yeshasvini
(0.25 %). Thus, in all countries with the exception of
these two Indian schemes an important share of the
Table 8 Enrolment rates, uninsured population groups, and exclusion and inclusion errors
Country Total insured
population





(inclusion error)Eligible group Total population Total insured
population
Cambodia: 27 % (2013) [41] 1st income quintile
women and men
(79 % and 86 %
in 2010) [97], poor
(77 %) [8]
HEFs 76 % (2012) [30] approx.50 % (2008) [98] n/a Approx.25 % [29] Approx.10 % [29]
SUBO n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
China: 99 % (2012) [99]




NRCMS 95 % (2012) [101] 62 % (2011) [31] 64 % (2011) [31] n/a n/a n/a
MFA 100 % (2011) [46] 5–6 % (2011)—those
with full subsidization
of the contributions [31]




India: 25 % (2014) [102] Formal sector
employees (8 %),
informal sector [12]RSBY 28–38 % (depending
on poverty estimation
model) (2011) [103]
7 % (2010) [12] 27 % (total India)
(2010) [12]
49 % of poor
40 % of poorest
10 % (2000)
[104, 105]
49 % of non-poor
(2000) [104, 105]
Yeshavini 25 % (2010) [12] 0.25 % (across all India)
(2010) [12]
5 % (Karnataka) (2010) [12]
1 % (total India)
(2010) [12]
n/a n/a
Rajiv Aarogyasri 97–100 % (2010) [12] 6 % (India) (2010) [12] 23 % (total India)
(2010) [12]
n/a n/a
Kalaignar n/a 49 % (Tamil Nadu)
(2010) [12]
12 % (total India)
(2010) [12]
n/a n/a
Vajapayee Arogyasri n/a 0.12 % (India) (2010) [12] 0.5 % (total India)
(2010) [12]
n/a n/a
Indonesia: 69 % (2013) [106] Formal sector workers,
poor and near-poor
(59 % in 2010) [59]
48 % of Q1 (2009) [59] 68 % in Q2-Q5
43 % in Q3-Q5
(2009) [59]
52 % (2010) [33]
Poor 35 % (2010) [59] 15 % (2010) [59] 27 % (2010) [59]
Near poor 17 % (2010) [59] 31 % (2010) [59]
All subsidized 33 % (2011) [107] 25 % (2013) [106] 36 % (2013) [106]





















Table 8 Enrolment rates, uninsured population groups, and exclusion and inclusion errors (Continued)






Thailand 99 % (2015) [110] 100 % (2008) [111] 74 % (2015) [110] 75 % (2015) [110] Recently unemployed
[111], migrants [112]
n/a n/a







66 % of Q1 (2006) [59] 41 % in Q2-Q5
18 % in Q3-Q5
(2006) [59]Poor, ethnic minorities 98 % (2011) [54] 16 % (2010) [15] 27 % (2010) [15]
Near-poor 25 % (2011) [54] 1 % (2010) [15] 1 % (2010) [15]
Informal sector workers 33 % (2010) [15] 5 % (2010) [15] 8 % (2010) [15]
Persons of merit and
dependents, veterans,
children <6 years
67 % (2010) [37] 13 % (2010) [15] 22 % (2010) [15]
School children,
students
80 % (2011) [54] 11 % (2010) [15] 19 % (2010) [15]
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tain health insurance coverage.
It is equally important to keep in mind the share of
the remaining uninsured (see Table 8) and reasons
thereto. This share is tiny (about 1 %) in Thailand given
its universalist approach, whereby migrants and those
who recently became unemployed and transition to the
UCS belong to the uninsured. In the Chinese schemes,
largely relying on indirect targeting, the requirement of
residency status makes it difficult for internal migrants
to enrol (about 1 %). Coverage rates in Mongolia reduced
in the early 2000s, as herders and part-time students were
no longer subsidized and had remained uninsured during
these years, and the self-employed and unemployed were
also among the uninsured [49, 114].
As Table 8 reveals, the highest rate of uninsured
people is found in countries with direct targeting: 62 %
in the Philippines [115], 31 % in Indonesia, up to 75 %
in India [12] and 73 % in Cambodia. In Vietnam, where
direct and indirect targeting each account for about half
of subsidized members, the share of the uninsured
(33 %) is higher than in schemes with indirect targeting,
but lower than in schemes with direct targeting [15].
Financial protection
Global evidence has shown that there is a strong correl-
ation between out-of-pocket (OOP) expenditure as a
share of total health expenditure and the share of house-
holds experiencing financial hardship [23]. Thus, a start-
ing point is to look at trends in OOP expenditure as a
share of total health expenditure. Table 9 presents data
on changes over time in OOP expenditure and financial
protection measures of the total population, the subsi-
dized target groups or of poor population groups. How-
ever, the introduction of subsidized coverage may be
just one factor among several to explain changes in the
level of financial protection.
A clear decrease in OOP, comparing average values in
the years before and after the introduction of the
subsidization scheme particularly for the poor, was
found for Thailand and in Cambodia’s HEFs and SUBO.
For beneficiaries of India’s Yeshasvini and Indonesia’s
Jamkesmas, there was some reduction. In Indonesia, it
was found that some beneficiaries preferred not to use
their cards and instead paid out-of-pocket. They wanted
to avoid perceived stigmatization from health providers
and longer waiting times as a result of having to complete
additional administrative forms [33].
Only a very small OOP expenditure reduction was ob-
served for the beneficiaries of India’s Rajiv Aarogyasri
and RSBY and for China’s URBMI and NRCMS. In the
Philippines no change or even a small increase was re-
ported for the population, but when differentiated along
deciles, the poorest 10 % and richest 40 % of allPhilippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth)
members (regardless of subsidization status) experienced
a reduction of OOP payments. In contrast to this, in
Vietnam, between 2002 and 2010, OOP expenditure in-
creased across all income quintiles [126].
However, overall, in most of the subsidization
schemes, beneficiaries still incur considerable OOP ex-
penditure, even though cost-sharing rates are lower for
the subsidized than for contributors. This remaining
level of cost-sharing might be particularly problematic
for the subsidized low-income groups, since they are the
ones that most likely forego care [127].
As to the financial protection measures, namely cata-
strophic and impoverishing health expenditure (for the
definition see Legend of Table 1), the evidence is scarce
and mixed. Regarding, the incidence of catastrophic ex-
penditure, a clear-cut reduction was only observed for
UCS beneficiaries in Thailand, the most notable effect
being reported among the poorest beneficiaries again.
Some small reductions could also be shown for China’s
URBMI beneficiaries, as well as in Vietnam and
Indonesia. However in Indonesia, this was partly attrib-
utable to lower utilization rates. For beneficiaries of
India’s RSBY and Rajiv Aarogyasri, no change in the inci-
dence of catastrophic expenditure was found. In China,
NRCMS beneficiaries in the Western regions [120] and
those in income deciles 3–10 experienced an increase
[118, 120], while another study reports a decrease for
the poorest 10 % [118]. In sum, financial protection im-
proved somewhat in some countries and for the poorest,
but in a few others, it did not.
Utilization rates
It is more difficult to measure effective access to needed
services in the absence of data on actual needs. A proxy
for access to services are utilization rates [128]. Utilization
rates of the subsidized for outpatient and/or inpatient care
increased since the introduction of the subsidization
schemes and were higher compared to the uninsured in
six schemes, namely in Vietnam, Indonesia, China, and
Thailand as well as India’s Yeshasvini and Cambodia’s
HEFs. In Thailand and China’s NRCMS, the poor have ex-
perienced the highest increase in utilization. For China’s
NRCMS, Vietnam and Indonesia some studies also report
there was no impact at all in certain regions and that
among poorer beneficiaries the increase was much more
moderate (Table 10). Likewise, in Mongolia, utilization
rates for family group practice and district hospitals
became more pro-poor, whereas for tertiary care, they
became even more pro-rich during the period of
2007–2012 [129].
A comparison of utilization rates between subsidized
beneficiaries and contributors reveals some inequities in
some countries. In fact, utilization rates are still lower
Table 9 Financial protection
Country and
arrangement
Change in OOP spending since the year
where the subsidization arrangement was
introduced
Incidence of catastrophic expenditure (at a
40 % threshold, unless otherwise stated)
Incidence of impoverishing expenditure
Cambodia:
HEFs Reduced by 35 % on average
Reduced by 42 % for poorer
households [29]
n/a Reduced (no year indicated) [116]
SUBO Reduced by 18 % for the poor [117] n/a n/a
China:
URBMI n/a n/a n/a
NRCMS Mixed evidence: Similar [118],
Not reduced [90]
Decreased cost of a delivery, increased cost
of an outpatient visit (more expensive type
of care)
OOP effects smaller for 1st income
quintile [119]
2006: no reduction at 10 and 20 %
thresholds [120]
n/a
India: Protection from catastrophic spending is
limited since in India the main determinants of
catastrophic spending are outpatient services
and medicines which are not covered by the
vast majority of the schemes [24]
2004: 5 % of total population pushed
below the poverty line [24]
RSBY Total and outpatient expenditure decreased
slightly stronger in RSBY districts versus
non-RSBY district (but maybe subject to
confounding effects) [121]
n/a n/a
Yeshasvini n/a Lower borrowings/payments out of savings




Small reduction n/a n/a




Indonesia n/a Declined (and low compared to average
OOP) [60]
Lower among Jamkesmas beneficiaries than
for other insured groups [33]
n/a
Mongolia 2012: OOP payments in rural areas slightly
smaller than in urban areas and ten times
higher in 5th income quintile than in 1st
income quintile [122]
2009: Five times higher in 1st than in 5th
income quintile, two times higher in 1st
income quintile than across all quintiles [49]
2011:1.6 % of households in 1st quintile [88]
2012: 5.5 % of total households (at 10 %
threshold); 1.1 % of total households (at
40 % threshold) [122]
2012: approx. 1 % [122]
Philippines n/a 2009: 1st income quintile: 0.5 %; 5th income
quintile: 2 % [35]
n/a
Thailand 2000–2004: OOP share of total or non-food
household consumption decreases significantly,
especially in the 1st and 2nd income quintiles
(30 % reduction) [123]
2000–2006: 1st quintile reduction of about
3/4 a [124]
Incidence and intensity of catastrophic
expenditure declines particularly among 1st
and 2nd income quintiles especially in rural
areas [123]
Dropped from 6.8 % in 1996 to 2.8 % in
2008 among UCS members in the poorest
quintile (at 10 % threshold) [125]
2004–2009: decreasing in households
with one or more UCS member(s) [125]
Vietnam Similar average OOP spending for all
quintiles [53]
From 2002 to 2010: hardly changed in 1st
and 2nd income quintiles [37]
2010: 1st quintile 4.7 %; 2nd quintile
4.5 % [54]
From 2002 to 2010:% of households has
hardly changed for the 1st income
quintile and decreased from 11 % to 6 %
for the 2nd quintile [37]
2010: 1st quintile 5.4 %; 2nd quintile 6 % [54]
aThe remaining catastrophic health expenditure is mainly due to accessing designated services without proper referral (use of private services or public services outside
province) and services not covered by benefit package. There is a need to increase quality of public institution and confidence in their services and extend benefit package
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Table 10 Utilization of health services
Country and arrangement Utilization of health services (with a focus on curative outpatient and inpatient care)
Cambodia:
HEFs Increased utilization rates for the poor [86]
SUBO No increased utilization rates for the poor [57]
China:
URBMI China Health and Nutrition Surveys of 2006 and 2009: significant increase of utilization of outpatient and inpatient care
especially for children, members of low-income families and residents in the relatively poor western region [100]
NRCMS Inconclusive evidence:
Increased use of preventive care (mainly physical check-ups)
No increased utilization of formal care [90]
Increased utilization of inpatient and outpatient services
For the poor greater utilization in outpatient services mainly concentrated on lower level (village/township) facilities [118]
India:
RSBY 2.5 hospitalisations per 100 beneficiaries
Strong variations among different states (overall average for India: 2.3 for rural and 3.0 for urban regions) [121]
Yeshasvini 2003–2009: utilisation rate increased [65]
2.2 hospitalisations per 100 beneficiaries
Surgeries per 100 insured: 2003/4: 0.5; 2005/6: 1.2; 2007/8: 2.4
Outpatient visits per 100 insured: 2003/4: 2; 2005/6: 3.5; 2007/8: 8.62
Rajiv Aarogyasri 0.5 hospitalisations per 100 beneficiaries
Kalaignar 0.4 hospitalisations per 100 beneficiaries
45 % of claims are being made by women
Vajapayee Arogyasri 0.4 hospitalisations per 100 beneficiaries [12]
No significant increase in use of covered health services [130]
Indonesia Increase for rural public health centres and urban public hospitals [61]
Only an estimated 60 % of beneficiaries used health services using their health insurance card in 2006 [93]
Slightly higher outpatient utilization rates of 16 % among Jamkesmas beneficiaries compared to contributors in formal
sector scheme (14 %), local government managed Jamsostek scheme (14 %) and the non-insured (12 %) in 2010
Inpatient utilization rate of Jamkesmas beneficiaries are lower than that of Askes and Jamsostek enrolees—2.7 %
compared to 4 and 3.3 % respectively, but higher than that of the uninsured (2 %) in 2010 [33]
Mongolia Larger utilization among elderly, low-income and vulnerable groups
Low utilization among self-employed and students
Health service utilization quite similar across quintiles [49]
Philippines Evidence for underutilization among subsidized [131]
2003 survey found 35 % of 5th income quintile and only 17 % of 1st income quintile used health services in
the last 12 months
For the first quarter of 2009, 58 % of claims were filed by employed members, 18 % by individually paying
members and 14 % by subsidized members, while membership shares were 48; 22 and 19 % respectively [63]
The hospital admissions rate among poor households is less than half that of the total population, and three times
less than for the richest 10 % (for 2007) [35]
Thailand Significant increase, especially in district health-care system; pro-poor distribution of service utilization [124]
Significant increase in utilization of outpatient and inpatient services after introduction of the UCS, particularly at
primary care units and district hospitals [77]
Increased health care utilization especially among the previously uninsured
Overall outpatient and inpatient services among UCS members rose steadily from 2003 to 2011, with the outpatient
utilization rate increasing from 2.45 to 3.23, and inpatient admission rate increasing from 9.42 to 11.40 %
2003–2009: significantly higher outpatient and inpatient utilization rates among the poorest quintile compared to
richest quintile [36]
Still differences in average utilization rates across the three schemes:
Outpatient care utilisation rates in 2011: UCS—3.12; SSS—2.68: CSMBS—4.91
Inpatient utilization rates in 2011: UCS—0.11: SSS—0.05; CSMBS—0.16 [132]
Vietnam Inconclusive evidence:
Increase in utilization, stronger for inpatient than for outpatient care; stronger for better-off, almost insignificant for
poorest decile [53]
No change in utilization [133]
Lower utilization rates among poor and near-poor than the average utilization rates of all insured people [54]
Legend: CSMBS Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme (Thailand), SSS Social Security Scheme (Thailand)
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Indonesia (with regards to inpatient care) and consider-
ably lower in the Philippines. In China, differences in the
use of outpatient and maternity care services between
different regions and lower and higher income groups
have notably reduced since NRCMS and URBMI were
established [101]. However, the limited scope of the
NRCMS benefit package limits improvements in access
to outpatient services.Discussion
This section aims to explore the contribution, and in
view of scarce data, the plausible effects of critical insti-
tutional design features of such financing arrangements
on progress towards UHC. Importantly, there are many
other factors, relating to the supply side, service percep-
tion, and other developments in the health sector and
beyond, which can affect and explain UHC progress.The role of the targeting approach on population
coverage
In schemes with indirect targeting approaches, identifica-
tion criteria are usually easily observable characteristics.
Thus it is rather the enrolment process than the actual tar-
geting process that appears decisive for exclusion errors,
i.e. gaps in covering the envisaged target group. This will
be further elaborated below. An exception to this might be
Vietnam where the existence of 25 membership categories
can make it difficult to decide through which membership
category to enrol [15].
In contrast, correct targeting of beneficiaries in schemes
using direct targeting appears more challenging and target-
ing effectiveness is weaker. In just about half of the schemes
only little more than 50 % of the intended target group is
covered, with considerable inclusion and exclusion errors.
Detailed data is available from India and Indonesia and re-
veals that targeting effectiveness depends on a number of
factors, such as the reliability and validity of the (proxy)
means-test instrument [59, 104, 105, 134], availability and
accuracy of updated data [135] as well as administrative
capacity to undertake the identification and enrolment
process. In the past, lack of clear procedures had been re-
ported as a core challenge for Indonesia and the Philippines
for example [60, 68, 136]. To address these concerns, the
Philippines has developed a centralized targeting system in
2011. This system is under the responsibility of a ministry
and every individual can apply to be screened [35, 63,
95]. In Indonesia’s Jamkesmas, inclusion and exclusion
errors are have been caused by variations and discre-
tion in the proxy-means-testing criteria and poor
knowledge among the targeted beneficiaries [33]. This
points to the importance of standardized procedures,
rigorous administrative control as well as informationprovision to the public to ensure transparency and to
avoid vulnerability to ad-hoc decisions.
Nonetheless, the actual level of wrong exclusion and
inclusion might be less severe than at first sight. This is
because income distributions are often “clustered” around
the poverty line [104], i.e. differences in the income situ-
ation between households just below and just above the
threshold might be small, such that there is no actual
miss-targeting occurring.
In summary, the technical and administrative chal-
lenges as well as related costs of direct targeting, identi-
fication and monitoring render efficient coverage of the
target groups much more difficult than a universalist
approach or indirect targeting. Due to the considerable
share of wrong exclusion among the poor, countries are
in the process of modifying and improving their target-
ing process, for example by sharpening proxy-means test
procedures.
The role of enrolment procedures on population
coverage
Country evidence suggests that enrolment procedures
appear to be decisive for enrolment rates. For example,
in China’s NRCMS and Mongolia, population coverage
rates increased also as a consequence of simplified enrol-
ment procedures [87]. In Mongolia, capitation payment to
family group practices indirectly incentivised them to
reach out to their catchment population to enrol them,
however this stopped when payment changed to budget
allocations. It is difficult to assess the effect of “automatic”
enrolment by the administrative authorities compared to
active enrolment required by beneficiaries. Certainly,
however, active enrolment by the eligible beneficiary him/
herself requires the individual to be informed about one’s
eligibility status and to have the capacity to follow the
enrolment procedures. On the other hand, “automatic”
enrolment by the authorities does not imply that bene-
ficiaries are aware of their insurance/coverage status
and benefit package entitlement. Hence, some of them
may not use services. Another challenge is that entitled
beneficiaries may be affiliated, but do not yet have the
health insurance card to access services, which has been a
concern in some schemes in India [12]. Moreover, the de-
livery of health cards has been reported to be prone not
only to delays and technical problems [15, 59], but also
to bribes [47]. Finally, when enrolment of the poor and
near-poor is voluntary, adverse selection results, as in
Indonesia, and it was found that some people only
enrol when they need health services [33].
However, when local authorities benefit from higher
enrolment rates, e.g. by receiving higher central govern-
ment revenue transfers, they have an incentive to ac-
tively encourage and foster enrolment, particularly when
enrolment is voluntary. In principle, the organization
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or no disincentive to enrol members and encourage eli-
gible individuals to sign up. This is usually the case
when the organization responsible for enrolment is not
in charge of financing budget transfers or when it re-
ceives additional funds in form of matching grants or
commissions. Moreover, enrolment targets or reputation
and recognition related to enrolment levels also consti-
tute incentives. For example, central government budget
transfers were conditional upon achieving a target en-
rolment rate in China’s NRCMS [137, 138], and the
local governments were reported to have very actively
encouraged households to enrol, with membership be-
coming mandatory in practice [139]. Similarly, in India’s
Yeshasvini, cooperative secretaries had to achieve en-
rolment targets and consequently put efforts into con-
vincing cooperative members to enrol [75]. In contrast
to this, in the Philippines prior to 2011, local govern-
ments were responsible for both enrolling the poor into
PhilHealth as well as financing their subsidies. It was
found that without central government monitoring, a
large share of the poor were not enrolled [63]. Enrol-
ment rates only improved when the central government
ran enrolment campaigns, whilst at the same time fi-
nancing most part of the subsidy [47, 68, 70, 95]. Since
2011, budget transfers are again completely financed
from central government revenues.
The role of the subsidization level on population
coverage
Another decisive aspect is the actual level of subsidization
and the remaining share of co-contribution. Since individ-
uals or households may not be able to afford or may not
be willing to pay even parts of the contribution amount,
the assumption is that partial subsidization leads to rela-
tively lower enrolment rates.
But country evidence also shows that schemes with
partial subsidization can reach high enrolment levels due
to other factors coming into play. Partial subsidization is
applicable in four schemes only: China’s URBMI and
NRCMS, India’s Yeshasvini and in Vietnam for the near-
poor, informal sector workers, school children and stu-
dents. Given the high enrolment rates in China and of
school children in Vietnam (above 90 % and 80 % respect-
ively), affordability may not have been a key barrier [37].
Instead, enrolment practices and encouragement, which
have been pointed out further above for China, could be
an important factor. Similarly, it is reported that pupils in
Vietnam can be easily addressed and encouraged to enrol
[15]. Moreover, the actual level of subsidization could be
critical. Subsidization levels are very high in the majority
of councils of China’s URBMI and NRCMS (above 80 % of
the total “contribution” amount per capita), against only
40 % in India’s Yeshasvini. On the other hand, arandomized control study from Vietnam showed that an
increase in the level of the current subsidization level, i.e.
70 % for the near poor, together with better information
on enrolment procedures and benefits did not have a sig-
nificant effect on enrolment rates [140]. There are hence
other decisive determinants for enrolment of informal sec-
tor workers in Vietnam as elsewhere, when this is volun-
tary and only partially subsidized. People in the informal
sector cannot be as easily reached as school children. Like-
wise, access to care, quality of care provided and the at-
tractiveness of the benefit package and the offered
financial protection are equally relevant [17].
Notably, in Mongolia, herders and part-time students
were eligible for subsidization in the beginning, but later
on no longer because it was considered that their capacity
to pay for health insurance contributions on their own
increased as a result of privatized animal stocks and
expanded employment opportunities. This path is an in-
teresting alternative by starting with fully subsidizing
health insurance contributions for specific population
categories, before then gradually narrowiding down the
subsidized group in line with improvements in house-
hold income and people’s living standard. However, this
approach also faces the challenge to maintain high
population coverage attained as a result of the earlier
broad subsidization policy.The role of the pooling architecture on access
Having established integrated pools for both the subsi-
dized and contributing members, countries avoided frag-
mentation and enhanced risk pooling and redistributive
capacity. This is the case for three countries (Vietnam,
Philippines, Mongolia), which operate a large single
pool with a more balanced risk composition. Integrated
schemes also allow for cross-subsidization between con-
tributors and subsidized members. However, the findings
also revealed that cross-subsidization may occur from one
subsidized population groups to other (subsidized or
contributing) population groups.
In integrated schemes, notably, the benefit package for
subsidized member is at least equal to that of contribut-
ing members. In contrast, a separate scheme for subsi-
dized members bears the risk of designing a benefit
package that is smaller than that of the contributory
scheme, thus easily establishing or further institutionalis-
ing a segmented health system resulting in unequal ac-
cess to health services [66, 141]. This is the case for
China and India. But this is by no means automatic. In
fact, Thailand and Indonesia have set up separate
schemes, but benefit packages are similar. These exam-
ples show that political will is also highly relevant to suc-
cessfully ensure that a similar benefit package is offered
even when schemes are separate [62, 142].
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efficiency
A further difference between integrated and separate
schemes is the resulting market structure of purchasing,
i.e. the number of purchasing agencies and the degree of
competition between them. The integrated schemes are all
operated by one insurance scheme, i.e. a single payer sys-
tem. In contrast, in the countries that introduced separate
schemes, the system was already fragmented, such that
the creation and introduction of an additional separate
scheme increased this fragmentation. As a result, multiple
purchasing agencies exist and often employ different pro-
vider payment mechanisms. Yet these multiple purchasers
are non-competing, since people are eligible for only one
of the schemes. Thus, the assumingly most important ad-
vantage of a multiple purchaser system does not apply
here. Instead, compared to single payer systems, this
might result in a weaker purchasing power to promote
efficiency and high quality of services. Two other draw-
backs of multiple payer systems relate to reduced econ-
omies of scale and higher administration costs [21].
However, for the very large separate schemes such as in
China, Indonesia, Thailand and India (RSBY, Rajiv
Aarogyasri, Kalaignar), these are likely to be less relevant
for the subsidized schemes.
One core concern about a multiple fund/purchaser
system relates to setting coherent incentives for providers,
when purchasers apply different provider payment mecha-
nisms and remuneration rates. This implies that patients
from one insurance scheme may be more “attractive” to
providers than patients from other schemes. An example
of this distorting effect was found in India, where hospitals
contracted by RSBY have been reported to turn down
RSBY patients after a certain self-defined number of pa-
tients was exceeded. This is because the payment received
for RSBY patients was notably lower than that obtained
for individuals with a different insurance or patients pay-
ing out of pocket [70]. Another example is Cambodia’s
SUBO, which is reported to have weak administrative pro-
cedures, resulting in delays of reimbursing providers.
These show as a result little commitment to provide ser-
vices to subsidized beneficiaries [143].
However, in one respect, country evidence suggests
that the creation of a new and separate scheme may
have had an advantage. Some of the separate schemes
were able to move away from engrained but less efficient
provider payment methods. In Thailand, it was the UCS
that spearheaded provider payment reforms as well as
the introduction of a DRG-based payment system, which
was only later applied in the civil service scheme [69].
The difference is notable: Annual per capita expenditure
of the civil servants scheme was three times higher than
that of UCS in 2006. Similarly, Jamkesmas has been the
first scheme to introduce DRG in Indonesia [144].The role of benefit package design on financial
protection and access
The schemes that were found to effectively reduce the
incidence of catastrophic expenditure while at the same
time increasing utilization rates offer a comprehensive
benefit package including both inpatient and outpatient
services. This is the case for Thailand, Indonesia, India’s
Yeshasvini as well as Vietnam. The absence of or the
low level of cost-sharing in Thailand, Indonesia and
Vietnam for the subsidized or for the poorest also appears
to play a role in improving financial protection, although
for Indonesia the evidence is somewhat inconclusive. Evi-
dence also shows that utilization rates for the poor have
increased in these three countries. However, in Indonesia,
utilization rates of the subsidized are still low due to bar-
riers in geographical access, lack of trust in health services
as well as lack of information on benefit package. Other
studies also found that lower cost-sharing levels reduce
service under-utilization since co-payments often deter in
particular the poor from accessing health care [145, 146].
In contrast to this, India’s RSBY and China’s NRCMS
benefit packages focus on inpatient care and have been
less successful in providing financial protection. Expend-
iture on outpatient care and medicines account for the
largest share in total OOP [43, 147]. Likewise, in these
two schemes, cost-sharing levels are higher and benefit
ceilings lower than those for the regularly insured popula-
tion, assumingly a reason for no or very small improve-
ments in financial protection.
Health care benefits in-kind, i.e. the coverage of health
service provision without billing (other than co-payments),
in contrast to payments at the point of use and retrospect-
ive reimbursement thereafter by the insurer, constitutes
another important design feature that is conducive to in-
creasing financial protection and/or service utilization by
the poor. In fact, incidence of catastrophic expenditure did
not reduce in the two countries with schemes in which
beneficiaries have to file insurance claims, namely China’s
NRCMS and PhilHealth. One explanation relates to low
education status, as it compromises the successful filing of
claims as found for the Philippines [131]. There is also evi-
dence that subsidized PhilHealth members under-utilise
health services [148] given the inability to advance pay-
ments in low-income groups [131]. For China’s NRCMS,
there is evidence that immediate instead of delayed reim-
bursement increases the likelihood of seeking outpatient
care for the second quintile, but not for the poorest quin-
tile. This is due to the degree of cost-sharing [149].
Conclusion
Subsidization of health insurance type arrangements
through state budget transfers for people in the infor-
mal sector and for vulnerable population groups has
become a more frequent financing mechanism in Asia,
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14 arrangements in this region. Moreover, three other
countries, namely Bangladesh, Laos PDR and Nepal are
exploring or preparing the introduction of subsidization
arrangements [150–152]. This paper has shown that
this financing arrangement is a mechanism to expand
coverage through a non-contributory approach or
through the combination of contributory and non-
contributory approach. Budget transfers from central
government revenues allow the central government to
provide more subsidies to those geographical regions
with limited economic potentials compared to econom-
ically developed areas.
One of the key institutional design features distinguish-
ing the various arrangements is the targeting method, with
a universalist approach reaching the highest total and
group-specific enrolment rates. Financial constraints and
the large number of individuals that need to be covered
still seem to drive the decision about the targeting ap-
proach and the income threshold. A continuous challenge
related thereto are the high poverty rates prevailing in
these countries. Hence, in view of the current eligibility
criteria relating to poverty threshold levels, countries
solely relying on a direct targeting approach may continue
not covering a considerable share of the population even
in the medium to long run, and their goal of universal
health coverage may be difficult to reach [8].
Yet, there are also concerns around indirect targeting.
For example, despite its strong acceptance and support
among the population [55], categorical targeting of chil-
dren until the age of 18 (other than under-fives) may be
questionable from a distributional point of view, as house-
holds with children from upper income quintiles will
equally benefit from these subsidies, thus undermining
any attempts to shift to pro-poor spending. One pos-
sible approach to improve equity and targeting, for ex-
ample in countries like Mongolia and Viet Nam, might
be the gradual shift from individual membership to
family membership, such that dependents of better-off
families would be cross-subsidized through family in-
surance and no longer be covered through state budget
transfers.
Another concern is that the budget available for
subsidization of vulnerable or low-income groups is often
constrained, whether due to the general economic situation,
weak tax-raising ability or political priorities. Governments
often face a trade-off between the number of subsidized
individuals versus the financial resources available per sub-
sidized member. Nonetheless, a targeted scheme may rep-
resent a point of departure and gradual extension of
eligibility may ultimately lead to a subsidized scheme based
on a universalist approach. The experience of Thailand
shows that this is a path towards UHC, and other countries
seem to embark on this path as well, with Indonesia,Vietnam and the Philippines having substantially increased
and actually doubled the number of subsidized members
over the past 10 years. This path will require constant polit-
ical commitment and further resource mobilization.
In view of the smaller benefit entitlements for subsidized
members in separate schemes compared to those for non-
subsidized members, integrated schemes are the more
preferable option. Again, political realities may render an
integrated pool for both formal sector contributors and
subsidized members more difficult, particularly in coun-
tries that have already separate schemes. Establishing a
separate fund is certainly preferable to not at all expanding
coverage to those outside the formal sector. But it is then
important to work towards harmonization of the benefit
packages in order to prevent inequitable access to health
services.
Finally, this assessment showed that subsidization ar-
rangements can contribute to improved financial protec-
tion and utilization for the subsidized and thus reduce
inequities in access to health care services (i.e. inpatient
and/or outpatient care) across different income groups if
well designed and implemented. But further improve-
ments in the institutional design features of these
schemes are needed, particularly with respect to their
benefit package and co-payment rules. Ultimately, in
order to better assess the impact of these arrangements,
more systematic evaluations and more evidence are
needed. Future research could also assess the govern-
ance of the whole health financing system as well as of
the particular scheme to generate evidence how this in-
fluences progress towards UHC.Additional file
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